


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psychology long before he addresses the normative question of moral standards. For Smith, the core of moral learning and deliberation—the key to the development of identity itself—is sociality, and social unity is enabled through sympathy. The term sympathy is Hume's, but Smiths friend gives little indication as to how it was supposed to work or its limits. In contrast, Smith addresses the problem head on, devoting the first sixty-six pages of TMS to illuminating its workings and most of the next two hundred elaborating on its nuances. The last part of the book (part VII, Of Systems of Moral Philosophy) is the most distanced from this topic, addressing the history of ethics but, again, only for slightly less than sixty pages. It is noteworthy that while modern writers almost always place the literature review in the beginning of their books, Smith feels that a historical discussion of ethics is only possible after the work on moral psychology is complete. This is likely because Smith wanted to establish the principles of human behavior first so that he could evaluate moral theory in light of what he had already posited. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, not surprisingly, both Aristotle and Smith. It is also Stoic in its account of nature and self-command. The first sentence quoted above is a first principle: individuals are not egoistic; they are social. The rest of the book follows from this assertion. And Smiths friend, people want to share low-feeling with one another and will therefore temper their actions so as to find common ground. This is further indication of the social nature of human beings; for Smith, isolation and moral disagreement is to be avoided. It is also the mechanism that moderates behavior. Behavior modulation is how individuals learn to act with moral propriety and within social norms. According to The Theory of Moral Sentiments, mutual sympathy is the foundation for reward and punishment. 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My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your own account, and not in the least upon my own. (TMS I.1.1.4) We can see here why the imagination is so important to Smith. Only through this faculty can a person enter into the perspective of another, and only through careful observation and consideration can someone learn all the necessary information relevant to judge moral action. We can also see why sympathy is, for Smith, not an egoistic faculty: in order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume the spectators. The spectators, in other words, are not to be seen as mere observers, but as participants in the action, who themselves would feel, if they actually were the sufferers, so he is as constantly led to imagine in what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the spectators of his own situation. As their sympathy makes them look at it, in some measure, with his eyes, so his sympathy makes him look at it, in some measure, with theirs, especially when in their presence and acting under their observation; and as the reflected passion, which he thus conceives, is much weaker than the original one, it necessarily abates the violence of what he felt before he came into their presence, before he began to recollect in what manner they would be affected by it, and to view his situation in this candid and impartial light. (TMS I.1.4.2) Contrary to the description put forth by the Adam Smith Problem, sympathy cannot be either altruistic or egoistic because the agents are too intertwined. One is constantly making the leap from one point of view to another, and happiness and pleasure are dependant on joint perspectives. Individuals are only moral, and they only find their own happiness, from a shared standpoint. Egoism and altruism melt together for Smith to become a more nuanced and more social type of motivation that incorporates both self-interest and concern for others at the same time. Typical of Smith, the lengthy paragraph cited above leads to at least two further qualifications. The first is that, as Smith puts it, we expect less sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a friend we expect still less sympathy from an assembly of strangers (TMS I.1.4.10). Because sympathy requires information about events and people, the more distance we have from those around us, the more difficult it is for us to sympathize with their more passionate emotions (and vice versa). This, Smith argues, we are to be more tranquil in front of acquaintances and strangers; it is unseemly to be openly emotional around those who do not know us. This will lead, eventually, to Smiths discussion of duty in part III. 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In the past, the spectator would have been able to see the actor and the spectators reaction, but now, in the modern world, the actor and the spectators reaction are separated. The actor is no longer visible to the spectators, and the spectators reaction is no longer visible to the actor. By names dead, people want to share low-feeling with one another and will therefore temper their actions so as to find common ground. This is further indication of the social nature of human beings; for Smith, isolation and moral disagreement is to be avoided. It is also the mechanism that moderates behavior. Behavior modulation is how individuals learn to act with moral propriety and within social norms. According to The Theory of Moral Sentiments, mutual sympathy is the foundation for reward and punishment. 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What did adam smith believe in. Adam smith's book about capitalism is known as the of. What did adam smith think about capitalism. What did adam smith say about capitalism. What were adam smith's 4 key ideas of capitalism. Capitalism adam smith.

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